Innoculating Against the Financial Flu by Lichtenstein, Cynthia C.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
October 1998
Innoculating Against the Financial Flu
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein
Boston College Law School, cynthia.lichtenstein@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein. "Innoculating Against the Financial Flu." Boston College Law School Magazine 7, (1998): 28-31.
THE SCHOLAR'S CORNER 
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N. DECEMBE. R 199. 4, Mexico, Inoculatin" g 
the darling of international 
Investors SInce ItS recovery A" t 
from a debt crisis in 1982, suddenly ga.tnS 
experienced a severe financial down- th 
rurn. It was feared that the crisis would spread e 
to the rest of Latin America and perhaps threaten 
the international financial system. Although the United 
States Congress was balking at providing the funds to 
avoid a default, the Clinton Administration, together with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other inter-
national financial institutions, provided adequate emer-
gency funding. After much belt tightening and a deepen-
ing misery of the poor, Mexico recovered. 
The scare of 1994 prompted much academic analysis 
of what had been learned from the Mexican peso crisis. 
There as also a great deal of concern on the part of 
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industrialized countries' central banks and finance min-
istries about what the West chooses to call "sovereign liq-
uidity crises." However, the international community did 
not pay sufficient attention to prevent or even foresee 
what was just around the corner: that a minor financial 
crisis in the Thai baht in July 1997 would spread from 
Thailand to South Korea to Indonesia to Russia, where 
it-along with Russia's indigenous troubles-created a 
major financial meltdown last August. By September, 
Brazil, too, was threatened by the flu, and George Soros 
How to stop the 
spread of monetary 
.. . 
crzses zn emergzng-
market countries 
was publishing in the Wall Street 
Journal his planned testimony to the 
House Committee on Banking and 
Financial Services under the title 
"The Crisis of Global Capitalism." 
At this moment, the world's 
focus is 100 percent on what can-
or should-be done to stanch the 
deepening financial failure. Yet, the 
international community also needs 
to do what it should have done after 
Mexico demonstrated the dangers of 
accessing highly volatile and instan-
taneously moveable capital markets: 
reach international agreement on 
how to allow emerging markets 
access to foreign capital 
markets without jeopardizing global 
financial stability. 
What sort of domestic economy 
can withstand currency runs? If the 
international community can agree 
on what internal measures a domes-
tic economy that is less vulnerable to 
capital outflows loans needs to have, 
how can the borrowing country be 
encouraged to adhere to those stan-
dards? If the standards being articu-
lated are for how to regulate banks and secu-
rities markets , what is the connection 
berween currency crises and domestic banking 
and financial regulatory systems? 
THE CRUX 
OF THE MATTER 
Two factors explain why the strength of 
the domestic financial regulatory system is key 
to preventing sovereign liquidity crises. The 
first is the ambiguous role of financial inter-
mediaries in a liberalized market economy. 
Privately owned financial intermediaries 
are similar to private companies in any mar-
ket system. Their prime aim and their raison 
d'etre is to make money for their owners so 
their owners will reward their managers 
handsomely. To make money in a market sys-
tem is to take risks-carefully calculated risks. 
(In the case of banks-to wilclJy oversimpli-
fY-the chief risk is found in the various gaps 
berween a bank's funding, the interest rate at 
which it borrows, the currencies in which it 
borrows, the maturities of its borrowing, and 
the cost of its equity, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, the bank's investments, 
the interest rate at which it lends, the curren-
cies in which it lends, the maturities of its 
lending, and the amount of capital, equity or 
equity-like it has ro tide it over gaps that 
widen unexpectedly.) 
In a market economy using private entities 
as its pistons, the control over the degree of 
risk incurred in the search for gain is the fear 
of failure and the owners' loss of their invest-
ment. However, private 
banks perform quasi-pub-
lic functions in market 
economies. They are reposi-
tories for the savings of the 
public. They are also adminis-
trators of the payments 
system and the levers by 
which macro-economic mon-
etary policy set by the govern-
ment or the central bank is trans-
mitted. Simply stated, governments feel spe-
cial constraints against allowing banks that 
misgauged risk to fail. 
The owners and managers of private 
banks are aware of this privileged position 
and come to count on being "bailed our," 
and the public, placing its deposits in banks 
(that is, funding the banks), does not exercise 
an investor's discipline over the entities. That 
is because the public does not have access to 
sufficient information about the relative risk-
mess of each individual bank's business to 
choose among them. And why should it, in a 
system where the government, to give these 
quasi-public entities preferred access to pub-
lic saving, has guaranteed repayment of at 
least a portion of deposits? 
This dilemma, of using privately owned 
entities to funnel household savings from the 
public to productive enterprise and so being 
reluctant to let these intermediaries fail, is 
known by the funny name of "moral hazard." 
The dilemma exists for modern industrialized 
economics, as recently illustrated for the 
United States by the savings and loan debacle 
and for Europe by the Scandinavian banking 
crisis. It is particularly acute in emerging mar-
ket economies that have liberalized their cap-
ital accounts and do not restrict or at least 
oversee hard currency borrowings by their 
intermediaries. 
The financial commentator of the Finan-
cial Times, Martin Wolf, published a brilliant 
analysis called "Why Banks Are Dangerous," 
in which he points our that a central bank 
cannot be a lender of last resort in a foreign 
currency. Neither can its government insure 
foreign currency deposits. If an intermediary 
in an emerging market economy borrows in a 
foreign currency and then lends to its borrow-
ers either in the national currency or in the 
foreign currency, it has incurred foreign 
exchange risk (sometimes called "transfer 
risk"). If the intermediary has lent in the 
national currency, it (that is to say, its govern-
ment, which has explicitly or implicitly guar-
anteed its liabilities) has run the risk that its 
borrower will repay in a depreciated or deval-
ued national currency. If the intermediary has 
lent in the foreign currency, its own borrow-
ers , who have to get the foreign currency to 
repair their loans, may not be able to do so. 
Bur its borrowers' defaults do not excuse the 
intermediary from having to repay its own 
hard-currency borrowing in now more expen-
sive hard currency-or use up its govern-
ment's reserves to avoid default. If it has lent 
to a domestic borrower in the foreign curren-
cy, the domestic borrower's ability to pay both 
interest and principle is severely affected by 
the depreciation of the local currency. 
The uncovered foreign currency borrowing 
by the emerging market financial intermedi-
aries has put the country whose currency may 
be entering a crisis at risk of having to use its 
foreign currency reserves to support its 
domestic banking system. This may occur 
just when the country needs its reserves to 
support its exchange rate against the specula-
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tive attacks on the oversupply of its cur-
rency that is created when foreign 
investors sell out and go elsewhere. The 
more the country has supported its 
domestic banking system with deposit or 
other guarantees explicit or implied, the 
more the country must act as if those 
guarantees will be honored. It must do 
so to avoid adding a domestic run on 
financial institutions to the sudden out-
flow of foreign investment. As the 
Financial Times put it: "Foreign direct 
investment is invaluable. But easy private-
sector access to short-term borrowing can 
be lethal." 
The second factor as to why the 
strength of the domestic banking sector 
is key to a government's capacity to deal 
with a cutrency crisis lies in an absolute-
ly traditional remedy for meeting capital 
outflows: raising the domestic interest 
rate (thus meeting the competition from 
greater rates of return in other markets) . 
Unfortunately, this macro-economics 
move puts severe pressure on weak banks 
trying to roll over their funding and on 
struggling corporations with floating 
rate loans. Thus the robustness of the 
financial sector is key to the govern-
ment's most useful tool to counter the 
effects of volatile capital outflows. 
MOVING TOWARD 
A UNIFIED STANDARD 
From a June 1996 summit meeting 
of a group of industrialized nations 
known as the G-7 came a call for coor-
dinated international efforts to develop a 
set of "best practices" in the area of 
banking regulation and supervision. A 
variety of international insti tutions 
responded, in particular the Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision. Togeth-
er with a consortium of emerging-mar-
ket countries, the Basle Committee in 
1997 released standard-setting guide-
lines called the Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision. 
These guidelines promulgate sound 
banking practices. What makes the Core 
Principles unusual is the Basle Commit-
tee's proposal that emerging-market 
economies undergo biannual reviews to 
ensure that they are implementing and 
adhering to the principles. The notion of 
a coordinated supervisory review is the 
first hint of concern for how to achieve 
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Emerging-market 
economies that implement 
widely accepted norms will 
gain improved access to 
the international capital 
market and may obtain 
sizable reductions in 
funding costs. 
compliance with an international standard 
when one is developed and agreed upon. 
The question will be the extent to which 
review by supervisory peers will be effective 
in shaming noncompliant countries to do 
better. Morris Goldstein, author of The Case 
for an International Banking Standard, 
makes the point that an international bank-
ing standard such as the Core Principles 
"lends further credibili ty to banking reform 
efforts-much in the same way that IMF 
support lends credibili ty to national stabi-
lization programs." Presumably, the appro-
bation of one's peers at the biannual meet-
ings will aid the efforts of those countries 
honestly struggling to reach the standard, 
even if the shame is not a sanction for those 
who are noncompliant. 
Before, however, concluding discussion 
of the issue of achieving compliance with 
international norms of banking regulation, 
it is necessary to mention another interna-
tional study on avoiding financial crises in 
emerging-market economies. In its reach, 
the study went well beyond the work of the 
Basle Committee and its associates in devel-
oping the Core Principles. The study is 
explained in a report tided "Financial Stabil-
ity in Emerging Market Economies: A Strat-
egy for the Formulation , Adoption, and 
Implementation of Sound Principles and 
Practices to Strengthen Financial Systems." 
Prepared by a working party of the G-10, 
another consortium of nations, the report 
covers not only the contribution to financial 
stability of transparent, fair, and efficient 
capital markets, but also the need for high 
quality accounting systems, "sound and up-
to-date systems for risk management by 
securities firms," suggestions for the role of 
the IMF and the World Bank, and above all, 
the importance of market discipline and 
market access channels. 
The report is of extreme interest. Unfor-
tunately, the international community did 
not have time either to absorb it or to use it 
as a prophylactic against this year's Asian 
financial crisis; events overtook the slow 
processes of international cooperation. One 
may speculate, however, that the existence of 
the report made the IMF's task somewhat 
easier in recent months. After all, when the 
IMF insisted on financial reform as a condi-
tion of its aid programs to Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Korea, it was dealing with 
some of the same officials who had partici-
pated in the G-10's working party. As such, 
they were already "on board," so to speak, 
concutring with the need for instituting the 
practices of good governance, supervision, 
and regulation suggested in the report. 
THE MATTER 
OF COMPLIANCE 
Now the question is , how does the inter-
national community ensure that emerging 
markets adopt the strategy? The norms and 
best practices developed by the Basle Com-
mittee and the G-10 are not "international 
law." The working party's report is very clear 
on this. It describes the consultative process 
by which, in the financial arena, norms of 
best practice are developed and then adds, 
"A formal endorsement may give the recom-
mendations greater weight. However, they 
have no legal home until they are adopted by 
national authorities. They derive their 
authority from the expertise of those that 
have formulated them and their wide accep-
tance from the consultative manner in which 
they are prepared. They come to be applied 
because they reduce risk, improve market 
functioning, and foster a level playing field. If 
the conventions or norms are not observed, 
market participants exact a risk premium." 
How, then, is it possible to persuade 
national authorities to adopt an internation-
al banking standard; provide oversight of 
domestic capital markets that ensures their 
transparency, fairness, and efficiency; and 
force domestic corporations to adhere to 
norms of good governance? 
It is only when a country is in the throes 
of a financial crisis that the international 
community has a method to insist on the 
adoption of norms of financial structural 
reform, banking supervision, and securities 
market oversight. The country, having lost 
access to the capital markets and unable to 
pay its debts, turns to the IMF and the G-7 
countries for aid. As a condition of the 
extension of its credit, the IMF imposes the 
reforms the community has now agreed 
upon as the necessary concomitant of the 
return to financial health. 
IMF conditionality, however, does not 
aid in the real purpose of the development of 
international norms, that is, prevention of 
sovereign liquidity crises. Emerging-market 
nations are under no international law oblig-
ation to follow whatever consensus develops 
on financial supervision practices. The 
IMF's governing treaty assumes that coun-
tries will meet capital outflows, although as 
the Asian crisis arrived, the IMF was debat-
ing amending the treaty to be anticapital 
controls. Last February Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan called 
publicly for putting sufficient preventative 
measures in place to ward off crisis number 
three (Mexico being number one and Asia 
number two). Such measures, however, can 
only be put in place by national governments. 
The working party report seems to sug-
gest that the desire to be able to access the 
international capital markets will encourage 
countries to adopt the standards . "Once 
principles for sound practices have been 
established, markets can provide important 
incentives for their adoption," the report 
states. "For example, emerging market 
economies that implement widely accepted 
norms will gain improved access to the inter-
national capital market and may obtain siz-
able reductions in funding costs." This may 
be true, but one needs to ask where markets 
get their information. The major interna-
tional rating agencies did not downgrade the 
ratings for the public debt of Korea, Thai-
land, and Indonesia until considerably after 
the crises had begun. It seems fair to say that 
whatever the agencies base their country 
analyses on, it is surely not an in-depth study 
of the quality of banking supervision in 
emerging markets. The global mutual funds 
are not a source of discipline; the aim of any 
such fund when sentiment shifts is to be first 
out the door. 
A MODEL IDEA 
In The Case for an International Banking 
Standard, Goldstein recognized the insuffi-
ciency of leaving compliance up to national 
regimes and made a concrete suggestion for 
obtaining compliance that strikes this 
author as exemplary. He begins with a refer-
ence to an already existing mechanism, the 
To make money in a 
market system is to take 
risks---<arefully calculated 
risks. 
Special Data Dissemination Standard 
(SDDS), which was put in place by the IMF 
after the Mexican peso crisis. The crisis 
brought home to the IMF the lack of access 
by the capital markets to reliable govern-
mental data. It thereafter established a stan-
dard for the statistical format in which coun-
tries seeking access to international capital 
markets must make public their economic 
and financial data. (The Fund is also work-
ing rowards completion of a similar standard 
to guide all its members.) 
The most interesting aspect of the 
SDDS, however, is not the standard itself, 
but the system that the IMF put in place ro 
try ro ensure that countries accessing the 
capital markets actually adhere to the stan-
dard when providing information to the 
markets. First, all IMF members were invit-
ed by the managing direcror to subscribe ro 
the SDDS. Second, the IMF created an elec-
tronic bulletin board listing subscribing 
countries together with their data and dissem-
ination practices. There has been a transition 
period-from the opening of the subscription 
in April 1996 until December 31, 1998-
during which time IMF members could sub-
scribe even if their dissemination practices did 
not fully meet the standard. Only egregious 
nonobservance would be grounds for 
removal. At the present time, forty-three 
countries have been listed as subscribers. 
After the transition period, subscribers 
can be removed for serious and persistent 
nonobservance. Procedures for removal 
could involve a panel of independent experts 
and would require a decision by the IMF 
executive board. The implication is, of 
course, that removal would entail the impo-
sition of a market premium on borrowing by 
the offending country. 
The IMF model is the basic structure 
suggested by Goldstein for achieving com-
pliance by countries with an international 
financing standard. Once the norms of best 
supervisory practice are worked out by the 
international consultative process, he would 
have the IMF (and possibly the World Bank) 
create a similar list of subscribers to the 
international banking standard. Since the 
IMF regularly has teams in all emerging-
market countries as part of its surveillance 
responsibilities, Goldstein suggests that the 
teams could inspect the domestic banking 
supervision mechanisms for compliance 
with the standard. Since subscription to the 
standard would be voluntary (with the car-
rot being, presumably, a better rate for the 
country's interbank borrowing and other 
forms of access ro the capital markets), the 
IMF inspection could not be considered 
intrusive. Whether the subject is arms con-
trol, the disposal of uranium, or banking 
supervision, inspection by an international 
agency is acceptable today in the greater 
interest of nonproliferation, whether it be of 
nuclear material or financial instability. 
There will, of course, be myriad details ro 
be worked out, in particular, the exact pro-
cedures for de-listing, which is the most seri-
ous penalty for noncompliance. It is even 
conceivable that an appellate body might 
have to be created ro reconsider a sub-
scriber's removal from the list. As of this 
writing, the detailed legalistic dispute resolu-
tion system of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, including an appellate body, seems ro 
be working just fine. Why should the inter-
national monetary system not benefit from 
novel ways ro ensure national compliance 
with international standards as well? _ 
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